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COMMENT
1987 CHANGES TO LUMP SUM PAYMENT
PROVISIONS IN THE MONTANA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
Cynthia Kegley Smith*
In reaction to real and perceived problems in the workers'
compensation system, Montana's 1987 legislature dramatically re-
vised the provisions for lump sum payments to injured workers.1
The revisions place claimants at the whim of insurers, drastically
reducing the availability of benefit conversions. This comment ex-
amines the history of lump sum payments in Montana, the changes
wrought by the 1987 legislature, and the effect of the changes on
claimants. It then attempts to offer suggestions for other, less
harsh solutions to problems with lump sum payments.
I. BACKGROUND
Nearly every state allows injured workers to receive their
workers' compensation benefits in lump sum payments2 in either of
two ways. Workers may receive payment for the entire amount of
their employers' liability in a lump sum settlement, or they may
receive partial payment in a lump sum advance.3 However, pay-
* The comments of David J. Patterson, Professor of Law, University of Montana
School of Law; Gregory S. Munro, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mon-
tana School of Law; Norman H. Grosfield, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana; and Thomas
C. Bulman, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana, were most helpful to the author of this
comment. Any errors or omissions, however, are the author's alone.
1. For a thorough discussion of the background of the legislative changes see Luck,
The 1987 Amendments to the Montana Workers' Compensation Act-From the Em-
ployer's Perspective, this issue, and Trieweiler, The New Workers' Compensation
Act-Something for All Montanans to Be Ashamed of, this issue.
2. The only state which does not allow lump sum conversions is Vermont. Vermont's
statute authorizing lump sum payments was repealed on May 3, 1978. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 653 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
3. See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DEATH
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ments in one or several lump sums contravene the underlying pur-
pose of workers' compensation systems, to replace wages.4 Work-
ers' compensation was designed as a method of income protection. 5
State systems, therefore, provide for weekly
6 or biweekly benefits. 7
Legislatures fashioned these periodic benefits because they recog-
nized that unsupervised spending of lump sum payments often re-
sults in dissipation, leaving the claimant with no support other
than public assistance.8 Because of this recognition, most states re-
quire the injured worker to demonstrate that a lump sum payment
is in his or her "best interest."9
In deciding whether to affirm lump sum payments, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has followed this national best interest stan-
dard, holding that lump sum payments must be the exception
rather than the rule.'0 The court, however, has indicated that lump
sum payments should not be denied when they are clearly in the
claimant's best interest." Because the best interest standard is
vague, state courts have had to decide significant numbers of cases
defining the standard.' 2 The Montana Supreme Court has held
that judges must examine each claimant's circumstances, and that
each case "stands or falls on its own merits."'" The court has fur-
ther held that the Workers' Compensation Court is the most quali-
fied forum to determine the best interest of the claimant.'4 The
determination should turn on whether the lump sum payment best
serves the claimant, his or her family, and the public.'
5
Factors used to determine the claimant's best interest include
physical or financial need,' 6 preexisting debts, opportunity for




7. Montana's Workers' Compensation Act provides for biweekly wage replacement
benefits. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-701, -703 (1987).
8. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 82.72(d).
9. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at § 82.72. See also, Comment,
Workers' Compensation, An Analysis of Tennessee's Lump Sum Provisions, 14 MEM. ST.
U.L. REV. 579, 585 (1984).
10. Kuehn v. Nat'l Farmers Union Property & Gas Co., 164 Mont. 303, 307, 521 P.2d
921, 923 (1974).
11. Landeen v. Toole County Ref. Co., 85 Mont. 41, 47, 277 P. 615, 617 (1929).
12. See LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at -§ 82.72.
13. Utick v. Utick, 181 Mont. 351, 355, 593 P.2d 739, 741 (1979).
14. Willoughby v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 187 Mont. 253, 261, 609 P.2d 700, 704
(1980).
15. Kustudia v. Indus. Accident Bd., 127 Mont. 115, 123, 258 P.2d 965, 969 (1953).
16. Ruple v. Bob Peterson Logging Co., - Mont. -, , 679 P.2d 1252, 1254
(1984) (claimant's other income sources are properly considered in determining need). See
also Krause v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 187 Mont. 102, 104-05, 641 P.2d 458, 459 (1982)
[Vol. 50
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self-employment,'" and the purchase of items which will improve
general living conditions"9 or assist in living with handicaps." The
court does not consider certain other reasons valid, such as the op-
portunity to collect interest on the lump sum,2' the ability to
purchase a home and thus avoid future rent increases,22 or the de-
sire to obtain the lump sum because the claimant probably will not
live long enough to receive all the future benefits.
2 3
After the 1987 statutory changes, Montana joined a small mi-
nority of states24 requiring that the injured worker and the insurer
must agree to convert the future benefits to a lump sum. 25 Prior to
the 1987 legislative changes, the failure of these parties to agree
was a dispute over which the Workers' Compensation Court had
jurisdiction. 6 The 1987 provisions remove this jurisdiction except
in cases where permanently totally disabled workers seek lump
(claimant must show pressing need in order to obtain a lump sum payment for the purchase
of a mobile home park); Belton v. Carlton Transp., - Mont. -, -, 714 P.2d 148,
150 (1986) (claimant must show pressing need for fuel efficient car). But see Utick, 181
Mont. at 356, 593 P.2d at 741-42 (lack of pressing need can be disregarded when claimants
are able to demonstrate unquestionably that their ability to support themselves will be en-
hanced by the lump sum payment and that they have previously suffered ill treatment at
the hands of the Division of Workers' Compensation).
17. See, e.g., Byrd v. Ramsey Eng'g, - Mont. 701 P.2d 1385, 1387
(1985) (exception allowed where claimant acquired debt after injury, when the debt was a
loan secured to pay a large balloon payment, and the anticipated lump sum payment was
used as collateral for the loan).
18. See, e.g., Malmedahl v. Indus. Accident Bd., 135 Mont. 554, 558, 342 P.2d 745, 747
(1959) (claimants must show ability and capacity to rehabilitate themselves through the
self-employment venture).
19. See, e.g., Willoughby, - Mont. at -, 609 P.2d at 703 (desire to purchase
more fuel efficient car was sufficient reason).
20. Willis v. Long Constr. Co., - Mont. -,_ 690 P.2d 434, 435 (1984).
21. Kent v. Sievert, 158 Mont. 79, 80-81, 489 P.2d 104, 105 (1971).
22. Belton, - Mont. at - , 714 P.2d at 150.
23. See Laukaitis v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 135 Mont. 469, 474, 342 P.2d
752, 755 (1959).
24. States requiring employer or insurer agreement include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 23-
5-83 (1986 & Supp. 1988); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.012 (1984); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1067(B) (1987) (workers with permanent partial disabilities may not receive lump
sum payments without insurer's agreement); but see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1067(A)
(allowing lump sum payments in the absence of insurer's agreement to workers with perma-
nent total disabilities); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-3-3-25 (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1988);
Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.150 (Baldwin 1988); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:1274 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 48
(West 1976 & Supp. 1988); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.237(835) (Callaghan 1981 &
Supp. 1988); Texas, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 15 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1988);
and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-74 (1987).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1987).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(5) (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-
741 (1987).
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sum advances." If the parties agree to convert the benefits, such
agreements are subject to the approval of the Division of Workers'
Compensation.28 Because lump sum payments convert tomorrow's
dollars into one current payment, the insurers usually discount
payments to present value.29
II. THE 1987 CHANGES IN MONTANA'S LUMP SUM PROVISIONS
In an effort to reduce litigation in workers' compensation cases
and to reduce workers' compensation insurance rates,30 the 1987
Montana legislature completely rewrote the statutory provision au-
thorizing lump sum payments for lost wages. 3' The legislature
27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(1) (1987).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(1), (2), (3), (4) (1987).
29. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at § 82.71, n.29. In 1984, the
Montana Supreme Court held that the Montana legislature did not intend that workers'
compensation lump sum payments be discounted to present value. Willis, - Mont. at
, 690 P.2d at 438. The 1985 legislature responded by specifically providing that all lump
sum payments must be discounted to present value. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(1) (1985),
amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1987). Although the present version of MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 contains no provision regarding discounting lump sum payments to
present value, such a provision is unnecessary because lump sum advances for permanent
total disability are capped at $20,000. All other forms of lump sum payments under MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 are subject to agreement of the employer or insurer who, presuma-
bly, will not offer an amount exceeding the present value of future benefits.
30. See, Luck, supra note 1; Trieweiler, supra note 1.
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1987) provides:
(1)(a) Benefits may be converted in whole to a lump sum:
(i) if a claimant and an insurer dispute the initial compensability of an injury;
and
(ii) if a claimant and an insurer agree to a settlement.
(b) The agreement is subject to division [of Workers' Compensation] ap-
proval. The division may disapprove an agreement under this section only if there
is not a reasonable dispute over compensability.
(c) Upon approval, the agreement constitutes a compromise and release set-
tlement and may not be reopened by the division or by any court.
(d) The parties' failure to reach an agreement is not a dispute over which a
mediator or the workers' compensation court has jurisdiction.
(2)(a) If an insurer has accepted initial liability for an injury, permanent total
and permanent partial wage supplement benefits may be converted in whole to a
lump-sum payment.
(b) The conversion may be made only upon agreement between a claimant
and an insurer.
(c) The agreement is subject to division approval. The division may approve
an agreement if:
(i) there is reasonable dispute concerning the amount of the insurer's future
liability or benefits; or
(ii) the amount of the insurer's projected liability is reasonably certain and
the settlement amount is not substantially less than the present value of the
insurer's liability.
(d) The parties' failure to reach agreement is not a dispute over which a
mediator or the workers' compensation court has jurisdiction.
4
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made major changes in two areas: access to the Workers' Compen-
sation Court, and the allowable amount of lump sum advances.
In the first area, access to the courts, the pre-1987 statute
granted jurisdiction to the Workers' Compensation Court over any
(e) Upon approval, the agreement constitutes a compromise and release set-
tlement and may not be reopened by the division or by any court.
(3)(a) Permanent partial wage supplement benefits may be converted to a
lump-sum advance.
(b) The conversion may be made only upon agreement between a claimant
and an insurer.
(c) The agreement is subject to division approval. The division may approve
an agreement if the parties demonstrate that the claimant has financial need that:
(i) relates to the necessities of life or relates to an accumulation of debt in-
curred prior to injury; and
(ii) arises subsequent to the date of injury or arises because of reduced income
as a result of the injury.
(d) The parties' failure to reach an agreement is not a dispute over which a
mediator or the workers' compensation court has jurisdiction.
(4) Permanent total disability benefits may be converted to a lump-sum ad-
vance. The total of all lump-sum advance payments to a claimant may not ex-
ceed $20,000. A conversion may be made only upon the written application of the
injured worker with the concurrence of the insurer. Approval of the lump-sum
advance payment rests in the discretion of the division. The approval or award of
a lump-sum advance payment by the division or court must be the exception. It
may be given only if the worker has demonstrated financial need that:
(a) relates to:
(i) the necessities of life;
(ii) an accumulation of debt incurred prior to the injury; or
(iii) self-employment venture as set forth in 39-71-1026; and
(b) arises subsequent to the date of injury or arises because of reduced income
as a result of the injury.
(5)(a) An insurer may recoup any lump-sum advance amortized at the rate
established by the division, prorated biweekly over the projected duration of the
compensation period.
(b) The rate adopted by the division must be based on the average rate for
United States 10-year treasury bills in the previous calendar year, rounded to the
nearest whole number.
(c) If the projected compensation period is the claimant's lifetime, the life
expectancy must be determined by using the most recent table of life expectancy
as published by the United States national center for health statistics.
(6) The division has full power, authority, and jurisdiction to allow, approve,
or condition compromise settlements or lump-sum advances agreed to by workers
and insurers. All such compromise settlements and lump-sum payments are void
without the approval of the division. Approval by the division must be in writing.
The division shall directly notify a claimant of a division order approving or deny-
ing a claimant's compromise or lump-sum payment.
(7) Subject to 39-71-2401, a dispute between a claimant and an insurer re-
garding the conversion of biweekly payments into a lump-sum advance under
subsection (4) is considered a dispute, for which a mediator and the workers'
compensation court have jurisdiction to make a determination. If an insurer and
a claimant agree to a compromise and release settlement or a lump-sum advance
but the division disapproves the agreement, the parties may request the workers'
compensation court to review the division's decision.
(Emphasis added.)
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claimant, regardless of the extent of the injury, when an employer
or insurer refused to convert benefits to a lump sum or refused to
agree to an acceptable payment amount.2 The 1987 provision se-
verely limits this jurisdiction to a small group of injured workers.
Only claimants who suffer permanent total disability may litigate
an insurer's refusal to pay a lump sum.33 Moreover, these claim-
ants have the right to litigate for only a lump sum advance, and
not for conversion of the total benefits to which they are entitled.3 4
The new statute thus denies access to the courts to all other in-
jured workers desiring a lump sum advance or settlement.
Any apparent advantage to permanently totally disabled
workers seeking lump sum advances is limited, however, by the
second major area of statutory change. The pre-1987 statute con-
tained no limits on the number and amount of lump sum pay-
ments. 35 With the 1987 changes, Montana joined a handful of
states which place a cap on the monetary amount of lump sum
advances or settlements in workers' compensation claims.3 6 The
Montana statute now provides that the total of all lump sum ad-
vances to a permanently totally disabled worker may not exceed
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(5) (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-
741 (1987).
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1987). For full text of the statute, see supra note
31.
34. Id.
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741
(1987).
36. Eight other states limit the amount of money available in a lump sum payment.
They are: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1067 (1987) (providing a cap of $25,000 in the
case of permanent partial disability, and of $50,000 in the case of permanent total disabil-
ity); Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-52-103 (1986), amended by CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-52-103
(Supp. 1987) (setting the limits at $37,560 for permanent partial disability and $26,292 for
permanent total disability); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.20(13)(d) (West 1983), amended
by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.20(13)(d) (Supp. 1988) (providing a cap on advances in the amount
of $7,500 or 28 weeks of benefits in any 48-month period); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
pare. 138.7(g) (1986 & Supp. 1988) (providing that lump sum payments to the beneficiaries
of a worker killed on the job not exceed 100 weeks of compensation); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 616.07 (1987) (in cases of permanent partial disabilities which do not exceed 25% of
the "whole man," lump sum payments are limited to 25% of the future payments, dis-
counted to present value; except in cases of permanent partial disability or death of the
worker, lump sum payments are not allowed); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 41
(West 1970), amended by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85 § 41 (Supp. 1988) (providing that no lump
sum payment may exceed $4,000 or 25% of the total award, whichever sum is larger); and
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.130 (1962 & Supp. 1988) (providing that no
lump sum may exceed $8,500). At least two states had such statutory provisions and then
later repealed them. They are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.190(b) (1984) (providing that
total compensation under this section may not exceed $60,000), repealed by § 48, ch. 79,
SLA 1988 (Supp. 1988); and South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-100, repealed by Act of
May 19, 1978, 1978 S.C. Acts 500 § 1; see also Comment, Workers' Compensation Law, 39
S.C.L. REV. 231 (1987).
6




III. THE EFFECTS OF THE 1987 REVISIONS
The effects of the 1987 changes are not yet entirely clear be-
cause most workers injured after the new statute took effect have
not healed enough3s to request an advance or settlement. However,
future effects of the 1987 changes will be profound. In addition to
restricting access to the Workers' Compensation Court, the new
statute will impair claimants' ability to obtain legal representation
and will reduce claimants' potential benefits.
A. Legal Representation
For at least two reasons, several Montana claimants' attorneys
predict a drastic reduction in the number of attorneys willing to
handle workers' compensation claims arising from injuries occur-
ring after July 1, 1987,11 the effective date of the 1987 amend-
ments.40 First, new administrative rules reduce the rates attorneys
may charge claimants.41 Moreover, the 1987 statutory changes
make contingency fee arrangements unusually tenuous because of
the uncertainty that insurers will agree to pay lump sum advances
for permanent partial disabilities, or pay settlements for any type
of injury. The $20,000 cap on lump sum advances for permanent
total disabilities further limits the possible fee in a contingency fee
arrangement. Therefore, claimants' attorneys' only alternative will
be to accept their fees from their clients' biweekly benefits, an ar-
rangement which could result in collecting payments over several
years.
Pursuing a request for a lump sum payment is not easy to ac-
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(4) (1987). For full text of statute, see supra note 31.
38. According to MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-701, -703(1), permanent partial and per-
manent total disabilities cannot be determined until the injured worker reaches "maximum
healing."
39. Act of April 14, 1987, ch. 464, 1987 Mont. Laws 1092.
40. Telephone interviews with John Whiston, Whiston and Rossbach, Missoula, Mont.
(Aug. 11, 1988); Norman H. Grosfield, Attorney at Law, Helena, Mont. (Aug. 2, 1988); Mark
Connell, Connell, Beers and McDonald, Missoula, Mont. (Aug. 10, 1988); Thomas C.
Bulman, Bulman Law Associates, Missoula, Mont. (June 28, 1988); Terry N. Trieweiler, At-
torney at Law, Whitefish, Mont. (Aug. 8, 1988).
41. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.29.3801 (1987), Div. of Workers' Comp., provides that when
the claimant receives a settlement without a court order, the claimant's attorney may not
charge more than 20% of the amount the claimant receives through the efforts of the attor-
ney. If the case is heard before a judge, the claimant's attorney may not charge more than
25% of the amount the claimant receives. An attorney may charge an hourly fee not to
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complish. The Montana Supreme Court noted in Wight v. Hughes
Livestock 2 that the workers' compensation area is a "specialized
practice, requiring training and experience if the claims are to be
successfully negotiated.' 3 Workers will find it extremely difficult
to file a claim and to negotiate a settlement without an attorney's
representation. Yet, because of the 1987 changes, workers may
have to represent themselves.
Without attorney representation, claimants will be forced to
deal directly with insurers who may not be willing to settle claims
fairly. Without an advocate to fight for a claimant's entire entitle-
ment, the injured worker will receive whatever amount the insurer
decides to offer. Since insurers no longer risk litigation when they
refuse a request for a lump sum settlement, they have no incentive
to offer even the present value of the future benefits. The new stat-
ute does provide that if settlement offers are "substantially" less
than the present value of their entire entitlement, the Division of
Workers' Compensation may withhold approval."" However, Mon-
tana's Workers' Compensation Act does not define "substantial,"
and so the law hardly limits the Division's discretion.
B. Lack of Access to the Courts and Equal Protection
Because the new statute grants jurisdiction to the courts over
only those disputes between insurers and permanently totally dis-
abled claimants seeking lump sum advances, other injured workers
seeking lump sum payments have no access to the judicial process.
This denial of access raises a serious equal protection concern. The
Montana Constitution provides that "No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws.' 45 Under the new law, however,
the workers' compensation system treats workers who suffer per-
manent total disability and who desire lump sum advances differ-
ently from all other injured workers. In order to infringe the fun-
damental right of equality among injured workers before the
courts, Montana must show a compelling reason for the unequal
treatment."6 The Montana Supreme Court should not hold that
the legislature's desire to reduce litigation' 7 compels the unequal
treatment of classes of injured workers.
42. 98 Mont. 98, 664 P.2d 303 (1983).
43. Id. at 109, 664 P.2d at 309.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(2) (1987).
45. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
46. See Pfost v. State, - Mont. 713 P.2d 495, 500 (1985).
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C. Effective Abolition of the Best Interest Standard
Under the new statute the insurer unilaterally decides whether
to grant a claimant's request for a lump sum settlement.' 8 The new
statute abandons the Montana standard that courts must fairly de-
termine whether lump sum payments serve a claimant's best inter-
est.49 Now, in most cases, insurers alone make the determination of
whether claimants will receive a lump sum payment. Under the
new provisions, only workers who seek advances in their perma-
nent total disability benefits qualify for judicial, and thus impar-
tial, application of the best interest standard.50 Perhaps the Mon-
tana legislature excepted advances, realizing that claimants would
need advances to pay the heavy debts which often accrue when a
worker is first injured and faces drastically reduced income.5 1 How-
ever, claimants with permanent partial disabilities also face a debt
accumulation, and not all will have the ability to pay the debts.
These workers may try to convince insurers of their need for ad-
vances. Unlike the courts, however, insurers need not consider all
of a claimant's needs, and can therefore refuse to grant lump sum
payment requests, regardless of whether they are in the claimant's
best interest.
D. Inability to Obtain Adequate Lump Sum Payments
Prior to the 1987 changes, Montana courts found that lump
sum payments were in claimants' best interests for the purposes of
debt management,52 self-employment,53 relocation,54 and disassoci-
ation from the circumstances of injury.55 Now, under the new stat-
ute, none of these reasons can compel an insurer to convert the
future benefits to lump sum payments. Comparison of treatment of
cases before and after the 1987 amendments illustrates the harsh-
ness of the new lump sum statute.
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(1), (2), and (3). For full text of statute, see supra
note 31.
49. Willoughby, - Mont. at - , 609 P.2d at 704.
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(4) (1987).
51. Telephone interview with Robert J. Robinson, Administrator, Mont. Div. of Work-
ers' Comp., Helena, Mont. (Aug. 8, 1988).
52. Kuehn, 164 Mont. at -, 521 P.2d at
53. Lauderdale v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, - Mont. - , 745 P.2d 690
(1987).
54. Polich v. Whalen's O.K. Tire Warehouse, __ Mont. - , 634 P.2d 1162 (1981)
[hereinafter Polich I].
55. Legowik v. Montgomery Ward Co., 157 Mont. 436, 486 P.2d 867 (1971).
1989] 127
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1. Debt Management
Even if settlements and advances were available to all claim-
ants, in some circumstances the $20,000 available under the cap is
not enough to pay off pressing debts. Many workers have substan-
tial car and mortgage payments. Biweekly benefits may not be suf-
ficient to pay those monthly debt obligations and other monthly
living expenses. Under these circumstances, claimants will fall be-
hind in debt obligations. In the past, claimants' attorneys pre-
vented foreclosures by contacting creditors and advising them of
the possibility of a lump sum payment enabling the claimant to
pay off the debts." The current limit of $20,000 in total advances
in the case of permanent total disability may not always suffice to
pay off the accumulated debts of those workers now entitled to
lump sum advances. Even where adequate for those purposes,
$20,000 may be insufficient for both debt management and
purchasing the special equipment often necessary for claimants to
adjust to a physical handicap.
2. Self-Employment
The possibility of self-employment is perhaps the most com-
pelling reason for a lump sum payment. A claimant who can suc-
cessfully operate a business can become self-sufficient. Comparison
of the 1985 case of Rivera v. Home Land, Inc.57 and the treatment
the case would now receive under the new statute illustrates the
new law's probable effect on self-employment possibilities. Rivera
was injured on the job when the boom of a backhoe struck him,
causing him to bend over backwards from the waist." Because of
the severe and permanent back injuries he sustained, he was una-
ble to lift heavy objects and he could not stand, sit, or bend
normally.59
The Workers' Compensation Court found that Rivera was in-
capable of returning to any type of employment for which he was
qualified.6" However, Rivera found a self-service laundromat and
meat locker business which he could purchase and operate, even
with his disability, for $81,728.61 The court approved a settlement
in that amount, together with enough money to pay off $24,000 in
56. Interview with Mark Connell, Connell, Beers and McDonald, Missoula, Mont.
(Aug. 10, 1988).
57. No. 8503-2978, slip op. (Workers' Comp. Ct. Sept. 5, 1985).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 8-9.
[Vol. 50
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debts.62 The court further found that the lump sum payment to
Rivera met the standard that it would not improve his financial
condition over that which he could reasonably have expected had
he not been injured.
6 3
Under the 1987 revisions, Rivera could not have received an
advance large enough to pay off his debts, let alone large enough to
purchase a business. If he wished to receive a lump sum settle-
ment, he would have had that option only if the insurer agreed.
Moreover, he would have received only the amount the insurer was
willing to pay. In either circumstance, he probably would not have
received enough money to operate his own business.
Controversy exists over disabled workers seeking self-employ-
ment. The Division of Workers' Compensation administration64
cites the argument advanced by Professor Larson in his authorita-
tive treatise on workers' compensation. 5 A lump sum payment
often is not in a claimant's best interest because the money fre-
quently goes to the claimant's family and attorney, leaving little
for the actual claimant. Further, the Division sees a contradiction
in the proposition that totally disabled workers can be self-em-
ployed. The Division argues that people unable to work at a job for
someone else must be equally unable to work at a job for them-
selves.66 The employer in Rivera argued that the term "self-em-
ployment" was a misnomer in Rivera's case. Because of his disabil-
ity, Rivera would manage the business by giving orders to
subordinates rather than by "working" in any real sense of the
term. 7 The employer thus argued that in purchasing a business
Rivera was, in effect, purchasing an annuity,6 8 an inappropriate
reason for a lump sum payment.6 9 These arguments, however, ig-
nore the fact that workers' physical disabilities do not impair their
intellectual capacity to make business decisions. It is consonant
with the purposes of workers' compensation that workers use their
benefits to enable them to work in self-employment when physical
disability prevents employment requiring physical capability.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Telephone interview with Robert J. Robinson, Administrator, Mont. Div. of Work-
ers"Comp., Helena, Mont. (Aug. 8, 1988).
65. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at § 82.71.
66. Telephone interview with Robert J. Robinson, Administrator, Mont. Div. of Work-
ers' Comp., Helena, Mont. (Aug. 8, 1988).
67. Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for New Trial at 14-15, Rivera, No.
8503-2978 (available at the Workers' Comp. Ct., Helena, Mont.).
68. Id. at 14.
69. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at § 82.73.
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3. Relocation
Claimants often use lump sum payments for relocation in or-
der to improve their living conditions. For example, in Polich v.
Whalen's O.K. Tire Warehouse,70 the claimant was in his sixties.71
Polich suffered chronic back pain from a work-related injury and
was totally disabled.72 Montana's cold winter climate aggravated
the pain. The Montana Supreme Court held that it was in
Polich's best interest to have his benefits converted to a lump sum
settlement so that he could move to a warmer climate and avoid
Montana's severe winters .7  Even though Polich owned his home
and could sell it to obtain funds to help with the move, he was
unable to secure a good price for it in the depressed housing mar-
ket in his community.7 5 Noting that Polich was obviously able to
manage money,7" the court approved the conversion so that he
could make the move.7 7 Under the 1987 amendments Polich could
have received at maximum only $20,000 had he requested an ad-
vance, and possibly no other lump sum payments had the insurer
refused a lump sum settlement request.
4. Disassociation from the Circumstances of Injury
In a number of cases the Montana Supreme Court has found it
in a claimant's best interest to receive a lump sum settlement in
order to disassociate mentally from the circumstances of the in-
jury. For example, in Legowik v. Montgomery Ward Co.,78 the
claimant suffered permanent total disability after a heavy boat
which he was loading onto a trailer suddenly fell.79 Legowik's in-
jury resulted in adhesive capulitis, an affliction which limits mo-
tion and causes severe pain to the arms and hands.80 The pain re-
sulted in depression which exacerbated a preexisting emotional
problem. The exacerbated emotional problem in turn caused
Legowik's physical problems to worsen.8 ' The Montana Supreme
70. __ Mont. __, 634 P.2d 1162 (1981) [Polich I].
71. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 1163.
72. Id.
73. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 1165.
74. Id.
75. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 1163-64.
76. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 1165.
77. Polich v. Whalen's O.K. Tire Warehouse, 203 Mont. 280, 283, 661 P.2d 38, 39
(1983) [hereinafter Polich II].
78. 157 Mont. 436, 486 P.2d 867.
79. Id. at 437, 486 P.2d at 867.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 438, 486 P.2d at 868.
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Court held that a lump sum settlement was in Legowik's best in-
terest because with a settlement he could become "completely di-
vorced from the circumstances" that created the emotional
problems and proceed with his rehabilitation.8 2 Under the new pro-
visions, Legowik would not have been able to convince a court that
a lump sum settlement was in his best interest because no court
can accept jurisdiction over a settlement dispute. If the insurer re-
fused a lump sum settlement request, the new statute would force
Legowik to receive biweekly benefits and thus face biweekly re-
minders of the circumstances of his injury.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE LUMP SUM PROBLEM
As this examination of prior case law illustrates, lump sum
payments best serve claimants in some circumstances. Montana
should therefore make lump sum payments available to all claim-
ants who need them. In its drive for efficiency, the legislature
should consider other options which will also adequately provide
for claimants' needs.
One solution starts with the recognition that workers' compen-
sation benefits already fall far short of actual wage replacement.
Under the Workers' Compensation Act, workers may receive in
benefits only a fraction of the wages they previously earned.
8 3
Courts have renounced awarding lump sums for purchase of annui-
ties or other investments on the ground that these investment ve-
hicles would yield claimants more than their statutory benefits.8 4
In fact, however, yields from such investments often more nearly
approximate actual wage replacement. Thus, if claimants can im-
prove their lives by using the entire amount of an entitlement to
purchase annuities or to invest at interest rates higher than the
percentage rate used to convert the benefits to present value, they
should be permitted to do so. There is no reason to maintain the
legal fiction that through investment workers might gain some un-
deserved windfall from their injuries.
The most effective solution is for the legislature to repeal the
1987 revisions and enact new measures to prevent abuses. For ex-
ample, the legislature could require that courts or insurers monitor
82. Id. at 441, 486 P.2d at 869.
83. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-702 (1987) limits weekly benefits for permanent total
disability to two-thirds of the worker's former weekly wage, with an upper limit of the
amount of the average state weekly salary, which the statute sets at $299. Any worker with a
net income of more than $600 will have his or her income reduced by at least half, rather
than by two-thirds.
84. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra. note 3, at § 82.73.
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the claimant's use of the lump sum payments, ensuring that the
funds are used for the purpose for which they are requested. This
solution would overcome the more thoughtful objections8 5 to lump
sum payments. The insurer in Polich16 suggested this approach,
and the court rejected the suggestion.8 7 However, Professor Larson,
the leading scholar on workers' compensation, believes that "con-
scientious administration" is the "only solution."88
V. CONCLUSION
The changes to the lump sum provisions in the Montana
Workers' Compensation Act were abrupt and ill-considered, with
harsh consequences to injured workers and their families. Most
claimants will not be severely affected. For most claimants, weekly
payments are appropriate. Certain claimants, when faced with the
largest sum of money ever to enter their hands, may be tempted to
squander the money, leaving nothing to replace their lost wages
and no way to return to work and earn a living. Other claimants,
however, have both the ability and the actual need to obtain and
utilize the present value of their future benefits. Since this is no
more than the amount to which the claimants are fairly entitled in
all events, those who need and could benefit from lump sum pay-
ments should not be denied.
85. See LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 8 and accompa-
nying text.
86. Polich II, 203 Mont. at 281-82, 661 P.2d at 39.
87. Id. at 283, 661 P.2d at 40.
88. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at § 82.71.
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